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## CALVINISM AND CAPITALISM<sup>1</sup>

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### I

PERHAPS in nothing, not even in scientific outlook, is the contrast between the Modern Age and the Middle Ages more striking than in the changed attitude toward money and money-making. In the Middle Ages trade was frowned upon and the money-lender despised. In this attitude church and society generally agreed. The church was always castigating the sin of avarice. The making of money was designated by Thomas Aquinas as 'turpitude,' even though he admitted its necessity. The thesis that the shop-keeper could only with difficulty please God was introduced into canon law. Usury, which meant not only extortionate interest but interest of any kind, was prohibited by several councils of the church, and to a usurer the privileges of the sacraments were often denied. Even in those days there were, to be sure, practical qualifications of these theoretical judgments, due to the need of money — a need often as keenly felt by the lords spiritual as by the lords temporal. Nevertheless the generalization is safe that money-making was regarded as socially degrading and morally and religiously dangerous. Today all this is changed. Money-making has become the chief aim of modern civilization. In countless ways, gross or subtle, it determines our lives and thinking. It entices

<sup>1</sup> The following article is an interpretative summary of an essay by the late Max Weber (1864-1920) on 'Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus,' published in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, XX, 1904, and XXI, 1905, and reprinted in his *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, 1920, I, pp. 17-206. Weber's essay deserves translation into English. For comment and criticism see L. Brentano, *Die Anfänge des modernen Kapitalismus*, 1916, pp. 117-157, and Richard H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, 1926, pp. 315-317.

into its service many of the best minds of our college graduates. Even our professions, law, medicine, the ministry (witness the vast development of ecclesiastical advertising), are more and more entangled in its net, while the commercialization of amusements, including our college sports, is notorious.

But at this point a distinction is necessary. The change between the present and the past is not primarily in the greater love of money in the present. In all ages avarice has been found in all classes. Whether it is now more widespread than heretofore is not the important question. That difference, if it exists, would be only quantitative, not qualitative. Nor is the change in the method of money-making, its technology, the distinguishing characteristic. Capitalism has existed in one form or another in every age. The real difference, which it is Professor Max Weber's aim to point out and more closely examine in the essay which the present article discusses, is found in what he calls 'the spirit of modern capitalism.' The difference is psychological, or, more precisely formulated, it is found in a new 'ethos' of money-making. What is meant by this spirit of modern capitalism and, an even more interesting question, what is its origin?

Before attempting to answer these questions Weber makes a preliminary historical observation of great interest. He notes that the great trading-classes of the bourgeoisie have been chiefly found in the ranks of Protestantism. The proportion of leading industrialists, traders, financiers, technical experts, is greater among Protestants than among Catholics. The latter have always been more inclined to the handicrafts. The Spaniards early recognized this. They said that heresy (that is, the Calvinism of the Netherlands) furthers the spirit of trade. More specifically, these same classes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were mainly found not merely among the Protestants, but among the Protestants of Calvinistic or Calvinistically allied churches — the Huguenots of France, the great Dutch traders, the Puritans of England. In other words, the growth of capitalism in its modern expression coincided to a remarkable degree with that form of Protestantism which, as contrasted with Lutheranism, Weber calls the 'ascetic' form.



Montesquieu seems to have recognized this singular coincidence when he said of the Protestant English that "they are superior to all other peoples in three things, piety, trade, and liberty." Is this coincidence merely an historical accident, or is there some inner organic connection between these two phenomena, the rise of modern capitalism (or rather of the spirit of modern capitalism) and the great Protestant 'ascetic' movement, dominated very largely by the Calvinistic theology? At first sight the two seem quite unlike each other and in their existing forms they really are unlike.<sup>1</sup> In order to answer this question Weber next seeks to define more nearly what he means by the spirit of modern capitalism.

He chooses as the starting-point in his analysis of the spirit of modern capitalism Benjamin Franklin's 'Advice to a Young Tradesman':

Remember that time is money. He who could make ten shillings a day through his work, but goes walking half the day or idles in his room, even if he spends for his amusement only a sixpence, may not count this alone [as a loss], but he has, in addition, given up five shillings, or rather thrown it away. Remember that credit is money. If anyone leaves money with me after it falls due, he makes me a present of the interest. This amounts to a considerable sum if a man has good credit and makes good use of it. Remember that money can beget money [a theory the reverse of Aristotle's!]. Five shillings turned over become six . . . and so on till they are a hundred pounds sterling. He who kills a sow destroys its progeny till the thousandth generation. He who wastes five shillings murders [note the unconscious choice of an ethical term here!] all that might have been produced by it, whole columns of pounds sterling.

<sup>1</sup> The present article is not intended to defend these generalizations or any others which Weber formulates, but only to summarize them and point out their moral. The reader must consult Weber's own defence of his views against the criticisms passed upon them, especially by Brentano. Yet a careful reading of Weber will, I think, show that he guards himself sufficiently against the strictures of Tawney in his *Rise of Modern Capitalism*, pp. 316 f., where he seems to have been unduly influenced by Brentano. It must always be kept in mind that Weber is not undertaking to explain the origin of modern capitalism on its purely economic or technological side, but to explain its spirit, through which it has gained such a strangle-hold upon the imagination of our modern civilization.

It may also be well to remark here that Weber uses the word 'asceticism' in a kind of technical sense, suggested by the etymology of the word but different from the meaning of ordinary usage. 'Discipline' comes near to being an equivalent in plain English, and has been occasionally used instead of 'asceticism' in presenting Weber's ideas in the article.

It is not simply the saving of money for the use to which it can afterward be put that Franklin has in mind. The idea which really lies back of it is that of making money as an end in itself, as a profession, as a 'calling,'<sup>2</sup> in which all one's best capacities are to be engaged. Franklin quotes Prov. 22, 29, "Seest thou a man diligent [note the word!] in business? he shall stand before kings." Here it is not so much the reward of efficiency as diligence, or the duty of efficiency, in which Franklin is interested. He means to enjoin not the love of money but the obligation to make money. But where an obligation exists, there an ethical element enters in. It is this feeling of responsibility to make money which Weber finds the most significant difference between modern capitalism and the forms of capitalism current in past ages. In other words, the difference lies in the spirit, the peculiar ethos of modern capitalism, defined as a sense of obligation in money-making. When one seriously examines this sense of obligation, the question at once arises, Why does it exist? A reason can be seen for making money in order to provide for a man's family, or to secure prestige and power, or even to lead a life of self-indulgence. But there would seem to be something irrational in a ceaseless drive to make money and ever more money. It is not a native instinct in man. In fact, it has to assert itself against his native instincts. One of the greatest difficulties which capitalism in its modern forms has had to contend with is the frequent lack of this feeling of responsibility among workmen. For the intensification of production a sense of responsibility on the part of workmen is absolutely necessary. But if in an emergency higher wages are offered for increased exertion, workmen will indeed work harder, but are apt to work for only half the time; they prefer to halve their time rather than double their wages. The opposite method, that of starving workmen into harder work by reducing their wages, is even less successful in stimulating productivity. (But Weber notices, in passing, that among working-people of pietistic circles in Germany this feeling of obligation is often highly developed!) This indifference to the obligation to make all the

<sup>2</sup> This word 'calling' is to be especially kept in mind, since it is the clue to all that follows.



money a workman possibly can is called by Weber 'traditionalism,' as opposed to the spirit of modern capitalism. Before the modern era this traditionalism prevailed not only among the working classes but among the employing classes as well, and Weber draws a picture of the easy-going life of the trader in earlier times. He felt no particular obligation to increase his trade. He felt no anxiety lest, if his trade did not increase, it would dry up.<sup>3</sup> He did not feel it necessary to turn most of his profits back into his business instead of enjoying himself. An excellent example of the spirit of traditionalism is a bazaar-keeper in Damascus of whom I was told when I was in the Near East. My informant said he always liked to trade with this particular dealer. But there was one difficulty. You never could tell when he would be in his shop. It was his custom in the morning to go to his little booth, but he would shut up shop, no matter what the hour, whenever he thought he had made enough metallik for the day, and would then go home to smoke his narghile and enjoy himself. The mediaeval man, even a man engaged in capitalistic enterprises, would have understood this Damascene shop-keeper's intermittent trading far better than he would the ceaseless drive of my poor friend. He would probably have thought the oriental mode of life much the more rational of the two.

But there is another element in the spirit of modern capitalism upon which Weber comments, besides this feeling of obligation to make more profits. Those who are most permanently successful in modern business life are usually marked by a certain quality of self-discipline or 'asceticism.'<sup>4</sup> They are not the spenders and wastrels of the world. They live moderate and abstemious lives. They do not seek display. They must, if they are to be permanently successful, win the confidence of their workmen and customers. They must be trustworthy. Though Weber does not refer to them, John D. Rockefeller and Russell Sage are excellent examples of the type he has in mind.

<sup>3</sup> Contrast this with the feeling of a friend of mine, a very successful young manufacturer, who finally died of overwork. He once said, "If I do not keep at it all the time as hard as I can, I shall be forced to the wall."

<sup>4</sup> The mere speculator or plunger is not here considered.

Such men must pass self-denying ordinances upon themselves. Free indulgence in ordinary pleasures and recreations is not for them. A measure of rigid self-discipline is necessary to ultimate success. Thus, in addition to the feeling of obligation, Weber's analysis of the spirit of modern capitalism includes this tinge of 'asceticism.' Sacrifices are entailed. And for what? In order to make ever larger and larger profits! Again the question must be raised: Is there not an element of irrationality in all this, if it be judged by the usual standards of what makes life worth living? How can this curious phenomenon be explained?

It might be thought that because this spirit of capitalism is at present so necessary in carrying on the capitalistic processes, it is therefore a result of these processes, and the explanation might be given that this feeling of obligation is an adjustment of men's minds to the new economic era that was ushered in by the great discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries with their stimulation of trade. But Weber points out that capitalistic forms and capitalistic spirit, which so naturally go together, by no means always coincide. The capitalistic spirit, the feeling of obligation in one's business or calling, was prevalent in seventeenth-century New England, which was founded by preachers and university men in the interest of religion, but wanting in the Southern states, which were developed in the interests of business. The same spirit was wanting in Florence in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, in spite of a highly developed form of capitalism, but present in the Pennsylvania backwoods of the eighteenth century amid such primitive economic conditions that, because of the lack of gold, trade was almost reduced to barter and banks were in their infancy. Under such conditions Franklin emphasized the moral obligation of making money. Could there be a greater contrast than in this differing attitude toward money-making? Instead of being 'turpitude,' money-making is now itself almost a religion. A religion! Might it be that this strange irrational feeling of obligation to make money, though now unconnected with any religious interest, once had a religious sanction which gave it meaning and support?

The reader will recall the observation that the great trading



classes arose and became most fully developed among Protestants rather than Catholics. Is there not here a hint of some strange elusive connection between the Protestant form of religion and money-making?

We have now reached a point where we must embark with Weber on a voyage of rediscovery to a world that for most of us has sunk as completely as Atlantis beneath the waves of the sea. His account of this rediscovered world, and the connection which he establishes between it and the life of our capitalistic culture today, form the most fascinating part of his essay.

## II

*Lutheranism*

In casting about for a clue to the possible solution of the interesting question just raised, Weber lights upon a curious philological fact. He notes that Luther used the German word *Beruf* ('calling') in a sense which it had never before possessed. Nor is there any precise equivalent for it either in antiquity or Catholicism. It appears in Luther's translation of Ecclesiasticus 11, 21, "Trust in the Lord and abide in thy *Beruf*." From this translation and from Luther's use of the word elsewhere it became a standing word in the vocabulary of the Protestant peoples. Now the Greek word which Luther translates "calling" is *πóνος*, 'toil.' But to translate this by 'calling' is evidently an interpretation rather than a strict translation. What did Luther mean by it? From his use of the term elsewhere it is clear that he is here thinking of the labor of the secular, everyday life as a God-appointed task, a calling. By means of this word a religious significance thus comes to be attached to the secular life, even down to its humblest details. "God accomplishes all things through you," he tells us, "through you he milks the cow and does the most servile works." But more especially still, this conception of the secular life as a God-appointed task necessarily involves the idea that the proper performance of such a secular task is a religious obligation; and the idea of the obligation to live a religious life within the sphere of the secular which is found in Luther's use of the word 'calling' is one of the most momentous contributions which the Reformation made to social theory. How significant it is can

be fully appreciated only when the Catholic theory is understood which Luther was attacking through the use of this word. One of the fundamental doctrines of Roman Catholicism is the sharp distinction between the laity and 'secular' clergy on the one hand and 'religious' orders on the other. The adjective, 'religious,' was applied, not to the former but to the monks and the nuns. The latter were 'religious' in a sense in which others could not be. A different standard of morals was enjoined upon them. The general obligations of a Christian were comprised in what were known as *praecepta evangelica*, or the morals of the Decalogue, which were in turn practically identified with natural-law morality, or the law written upon the conscience of mankind of which St. Paul speaks in the first chapter of Romans. The religious orders, on the other hand, were obligated to follow the *consilia evangelica*, the higher morality of the gospels, specially expressed in the vows of obedience, poverty, and chastity. This latter morality was impossible of fulfilment in the secular life; in order to practise it, men must withdraw from the world. "Come out from among them and be ye separate," is the motto of monasticism. Thus what may be called a double standard of morality came to exist within the church itself.

Luther's conception of the secular life as a 'calling' involved a complete break with this theory. For him no distinction was permissible between two standards of morality, *praecepta evangelica*, to be performed within the world, and *consilia evangelica*, which can be fulfilled only apart from the world. All men are equally obligated to fulfil both the commands and the 'advices' of the gospel. And this fulfilment is to be accomplished, not in the cloister, apart from the world, but in the sphere of the secular life itself. This does not mean that Luther's attitude was essentially a 'world-affirming' attitude. It was not. He was to a very large degree inwardly estranged from the world. His view, as distinguished from the monastic view, may be summed up in the words, Be ye in the world but not of it. Nevertheless Luther's conception of 'calling' was the first and most important step toward a new appraisal of the secular life. For the Catholic, 'calling,' or 'vocation,' was to live the religious



life apart from the world. 'Calling' for Luther was to live the secular life religiously, to serve God within one's calling (*in vocatione*). The final step remained to be taken, namely, to serve God by one's calling (*per vocationem*). This step Luther does not seem to have taken in any decisive way. In his earlier writings he had a Pauline indifference to the secular life; it was morally and religiously neutral like eating and drinking. Later, through his opposition to monasticism, which he repudiated as egoistic and an evasion of the duties of love to one's neighbor, he came to look upon the secular life as affording opportunities to express this love. Through the various secular activities of our lives we are to serve others.<sup>5</sup>

But as Luther came more and more under the domination of the predestinarian idea, he began to look on 'calling' as an opportunity given to man primarily for the purpose of obeying God by humbly and cheerfully acquiescing in that lot in life to which God had assigned him. Not what a man could accomplish through his calling (*per vocationem*) but the spirit of obedience or resignation which he could exhibit within it (*in vocatione*) was Luther's controlling thought in his conception of the secular life. Thus it came to pass that while Luther opened the way for a new appraisal of the secular life by breaking down the Catholic distinction between it and the religious life, he did not himself develop the vast economic possibilities latent in this new appraisal. As a matter of fact he remained a 'traditionalist' in his attitude toward money-making, untouched by the spirit of modern capitalism. Through this new estimate of the secular life we begin dimly, though only dimly, to see how it may possibly have come about that Protestants rather than Catholics have been the chief traders and industrialists; the Protestant religion begins to invade the sphere of the secular. But it is yet a far cry from the religious value which Luther set on the sphere of the secular and the utterly irreligious spirit of modern capitalism. Is there any middle term between these

<sup>5</sup> Weber calls attention to the sharp contrast between Luther's view of the secular life and Adam Smith's: "We do not expect our dinner from the benevolence of butchers, bakers or peasants, but from their regard for their own advantage. We do not appeal to their love of neighbor, but to their selfishness. We do not tell them of our needs, but of their own advantage."

two extremes? The Protestants of Calvinistic origin have been the most conspicuous exponents of successful trade. Is the middle term to be found in this branch of Protestantism? To the examination of the great Calvinistic movement, or, more generally stated, of the disciplinary, or 'ascetic,' movement in Protestantism as distinct from Lutheranism, we must now turn.

### III

While Luther started from the experience of justification by faith, that is, from the human side of experience, Calvin's attempt to restate the Christian religion as against Rome starts from the conception of God. In his view God is absolute Will, and the only absolute that exists. Hence God is the only being who is perfectly free. Therefore what God wills is right, and must be accepted whether we can understand it or not (which is a fundamentally irrational conception of God). This free and righteous will of God expresses itself in Scripture, according to Calvin, in the double decree of election and reprobation. Calvin's treatment of this doctrine is thoroughly intellectualized; its implications are drawn out by logical processes; experience and emotion play little part in his deductions. In other words, Calvinism as a system, though it starts from an irrational conception of God, is worked out in a thoroughly rationalistic way, and this rationalistic note in the system must be constantly borne in mind as we study its practical consequences.

The first great consequence is what may be called an intellectual as well as practical other-worldliness. Man is not the centre of the system, nor is even Christ, but God. In the words of the famous answer to the first question of the Westminster Shorter Catechism, "Man's chief end is to glorify God and enjoy him forever."<sup>6</sup> This aim gives to life its reason, its *rationale*. Anything that diverts the mind from this one supreme

<sup>6</sup> In passing, it may be remarked that the real defection in Presbyterianism from its standards is not revealed so much by the heresy-trials and doctrinal controversies that have shaken it during the past thirty-five years, as in its practical abandonment, in company with most of our other Protestant churches, of this other-worldly ideal of life.



aim is a species of idolatry, a worship of the creature rather than the creator. Out of this suspicion of the creature arises the 'ascetic' view of life, so characteristic of Calvinism and of the Puritan movement generally, which continued to prevail even after the dogmatic system of Calvinism became seriously impaired. Again, since the individual is elected by the eternal decree of God, all intermediaries between God and man are, at least theoretically, excluded. No sacramental grace, no priesthood which controls it, no church, no human help of any kind avails here. The soul stands in the presence of its God in awful isolation. Weber calls this the "dis-enchantment of the world," that is, its emancipation from sacramental magic, begun by Old Testament prophecy, supported by the scientific movement of Hellenism, and now culminating in the Calvinistic polemic against Rome. It is at this point that Calvinism distinguishes itself most sharply from Rome.

Because of the elimination of all intermediaries between God and man there arises at the very heart of the Calvinistic system a tremendous emphasis upon individualism. That this individualism has played a noble part in the cause of human liberty is too often forgotten, but logically it is anti-social. It concentrates the attention upon the self, even at times to the extent of avoiding too intimate friendships as a worship of, or reliance upon, the creature. The gentle Baxter warns us that "it is an *irrational* act and not fit for a *rational* creature to love any one farther than *reason* will allow us. . . . It very often taketh up men's minds so as to hinder their love of God."<sup>7</sup> This intense pre-occupation with oneself is effectively illustrated in the opening chapter of the *Pilgrim's Progress*, where the Pilgrim's flight from the City of Destruction is described:

So I saw in my dream that the man began to run. Now he had not run far from his own door when his wife and children, perceiving it, began to cry after him to return; but the man put his fingers in his ears and ran on, crying, "Life! life! eternal life!"<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Note the characteristic emphasis in this citation upon rationality and irrationality, and the implication of the idolatrous character of too much absorption in human relationships.

<sup>8</sup> This terrific concentration of the soul upon its own salvation, even at the expense of friends and family, painfully affects our growingly socialized conception of religion,

On the other hand, in sharp contrast with this emphasis upon the individual, Calvinism has shown a much greater genius for social organization than Lutheranism, and with its intense individualism has been able to combine an equally intense social activity. The Pilgrim, in order to get to heaven, does not flee to the desert as an anchorite. His way lies, as Weber points out, through Vanity Fair. Not withdrawal from the world, as in monasticism, but struggle with the world is the Calvinistic idea of life. Not, "Come out from among them and be ye separate," but, Be ye in the world but not of it, is the new battle cry. Weber points out the striking contrast between the Divine Comedy, which closes with the contemplation of the vision of God, and Paradise Lost, at the end of which Adam and Eve go forth, in a kind of triumphant resignation, to battle with the world. In the Puritan poem, what has been called the "mysticism of action" has been substituted for the mysticism of contemplation. And this action is within the world, within society. But how can the intense individualism of Calvinism and its equally intense social activity be combined? The middle term is here the glory of God. That is the aim of society as well as of the individual. Through the improvement of society God is also glorified. And how is this improvement to be accomplished? Through faithfulness in one's calling. This world of ours was so arranged by God as to serve the needs of mankind. In our calling we too are to follow this cosmic hint of God and serve our fellow men.

But at this point Luther's conception of 'calling' undergoes in Calvinism a significant transformation. It will be remembered that Luther considered our calling to be the means of expressing either love to our neighbor or our acquiescence in the divine will concerning our lives. In the former case a personal, humane interest in our neighbor was the natural result; in the latter case there develops a rather quietistic attitude toward life. But by the intro-

and in nothing, perhaps, is the distance which we have travelled from the religion of our forefathers more clearly indicated than in the usual modern reaction to this passage. It is also instructive to observe in this connection how the old-fashioned individualistic revivalism is rapidly losing its power, as may be seen from its growing vulgarization.



duction of the greater glory of God as the supreme and absorbing motive of all human endeavor, both these consequences of Luther's conception of calling become modified in very important ways. In the first place, since the work for the regeneration of society is now to be done primarily for the glory of God, the emotional, humanitarian element in what we today call the 'social-service ideal' is largely eliminated. The general good of the many takes the place of personal interest in the individual. Social service becomes, to use Weber's term, "depersonalized." It is social only because it is performed within society. It ministers, indeed, to the good of society, but it is not done primarily for the sake of society. It is done for the glory of God. If it were done for the sake of the individual alone, that would set the creature in place of the creator, and so be a species of idolatry. Two illustrations will make clear what Weber means by a depersonalized social activity. In the life of Adoniram Judson his reflections are recorded after he had tried to evangelize the city of Proom in Burmah and was stoned out of town. His sad comment was that its inhabitants would have the chains of hell fastened upon them more tightly because they had heard the gospel message and refused it. If the purely personal and humanitarian interest had been uppermost, it would probably have prevented Judson from exposing the people of Proom to such a dreadful risk. But as it was, he felt that he was discharging the will of God: "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature." In 1915 the present writer was ordered out of Palestine by the Turks and left the country in company with many members of the religious orders and Protestant missionaries. One of these, a member of the Christian and Missionary Alliance, was asked if he expected to return after the war. He was doubtful about it, and gave as his reason that he had already preached the gospel in all the villages of Palestine and had thus fulfilled the will of God. The heroic but in fact absurd slogan of the Student Volunteer Movement in its earlier stages, "The Evangelization of the World in this Generation," springs from the same depersonalized conception of the social activity of the missionary. The evangelization of the world because God wills it takes the

place of the salvation of the world for its own sake. Contrast the appealing close of the book of Jonah.

In the next place, though work for the good of mankind is in a certain measure depersonalized when the motive of love to our neighbor is modulated into the motive of God's glory, there is no lessening of the pressure of work. If God has ordered and arranged this great physical universe for the good of man and through this manifests his glory, it is supremely important to correlate society to the same great end, and this is done through the fulfilment of such duties in our calling as are imposed by the laws of nature. No mere quietistic acceptance of the universe is possible here. The tremendous drive of God's will and God's glory lies back of all work in our calling. The normal result is a tense and ceaseless activity. Thus the new motive of life, to glorify God and enjoy him forever, this completely other-worldly orientation of our existence, leads to a rationalized and a quasi-ascetic view of life in general (we are to enjoy forever God, not creature-pleasures), a depersonalized and therefore rationalized view of love to our neighbor, and ceaseless activity within the sphere of the secular in order to bring the secular within the final aim of life, the glory of God. But this drive toward activity in one's calling which, along with the rationalizing of life, Weber wishes especially to emphasize, is intensified even more directly by another consideration which originates in the heart of the Calvinistic system, namely in the doctrine of election.

The great question for every non-sacramental religion is, How can I be sure that I am saved? or, in the Calvinistic formula, How can I be sure that I am one of the elect? In Roman Catholicism the church could mediate to the believer this assurance through the sacraments, especially the sacrament of penance, but in Calvinism, as we have seen, all authoritative intermediaries are swept aside and the soul is left alone in the presence of its Maker. And its Maker's will is inscrutable. How, then, is the soul to be assured of its election? At first the question was not so insistent in Calvin's own thinking. The promises of God in Scripture and Calvin's own unwavering



faith in Christ made doubt impossible. But as Calvinism developed, the question pressed more and more for an answer. Two answers were given. Assurance can be obtained either from the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*, the inner consciousness of the individual that the power of God is *in* him, or from the ability consistently to perform good works, the consciousness of the individual that the power of God is working *through* him. In the first case he is conscious that he is a vessel, in the second that he is an instrument. While the first method of assurance was undoubtedly emphasized by Calvin himself and always played, at least theoretically, a part in Calvinistic theology, the second method became the more important in practice. And it is at this point that one of the main differences between Calvinism and Lutheranism emerges. Lutheran piety is more of the passive, contemplative, mystical type. It shares with Catholic mystics the idea of the mystical union with God, in which God enters into the soul, or, rather, in which the soul becomes absorbed in God and thus finds assurance. But Calvinism had a highly transcendentalized conception of God to which the idea of the mystical union was inwardly alien, and, as a highly rationalized system of thought, it was suspicious of the emotional life favored by the idea of the mystical union. Emotions can deceive. For these reasons both the logic and the philosophy of Calvinism worked more and more away from the idea of assurance based upon inward experience, in which there was an important point of contact with the Lutheran conception of the mystical union, and came to rest for the assurance of election upon the outward sensible signs of a pious life. Certitude is to be preserved not so much through the feelings as in action. It is interesting to notice that whereas the Westminster Confession of Faith still relies on the promises of Scripture and the Testimony of the Spirit as the formal grounds of Assurance in the section devoted to that subject (section 18), it is held in section 16, on Good Works, that these *strengthen assurance*. Similarly the Savoy Declaration maintains that Christians are saints "by effectual calling visibly manifested by their profession and walking." Objective, recognizable signs in the Christian's mode of life are now required in addition to

inward feeling in order to give assurance. The great scriptural support for this idea is 1 John 2, 3: "Hereby we do know that we know him, if we keep his commandments." Thus once more we arrive at the emphasis upon action which is so characteristic of Calvinism. The will of God, God's own glory which is at the same time the chief end of man, combined with the soul's necessity of gaining an assurance of election, produces a tremendous drive toward action, as contrasted with the contemplative life.

We have now reached the point where the bearing of all this upon the peculiar Calvinistic conception of 'calling' may be seen, and at the same time the similarities and differences between Calvinism on the one hand and Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism on the other are most clearly revealed.

(1) Both Calvinism and Catholicism lay great emphasis upon works. Lutheran theologians often twitted the Calvinists with this romanizing insistence upon works. But there was a sharp distinction between the Romanist and the Calvinist doctrine of works. In the former, works are the means of salvation; in the latter, the means of assurance. By faith alone could men be saved — the Calvinist held fast to this great Reformation principle.

(2) But Calvinism followed Luther in ignoring the Catholic distribution of good works between *praecepta evangelica* and *consilia evangelica*. The former, as we have seen, furnished the standards for the laity and secular clergy, the latter for the religious orders. In the case of the laity, Mother Church mercifully took account of the weakness of the flesh. Any defective performance of the 'precepts,' due to the corruption of man's nature, could be made good by sacramental grace (penance). The consequence was that Catholic lay morality took on, in the Protestant view, a certain casualness. Lapses were easily made good. It was far otherwise with the performance of the *consilia*. Within the secular life these could be performed only to a limited degree; and so a life withdrawn from the world now becomes necessary. But within this withdrawn life itself the sternest self-discipline is required. The whole of it is subjected



to the strictest and most constant regulation. The 'ascetic' ideal, the necessity of which was waived for the laity, is reserved for the religious orders, and for them not even the sacraments could ameliorate its severity. It is true that here also lapses could be made good by the sacraments, but if 'merit' were to be gained, the number of lapses must be reduced as much as possible. Hence the whole monastic life had to be rationalized upon the basis of the 'ascetic' ideal. Now when Luther broke down the distinction between the life of the laity and the life of the monks, and contended that the full Christian life could be lived within the sphere of the secular, he did not work out the final consequences of his new position. He did not introduce the rationalized, 'ascetic' ideal of monasticism into the secular life. We have seen how in Luther's idea of 'calling,' that is of the Christian life in the secular sphere, there is expressed either a quietistic acquiescence in the will of God or love to our neighbor. He laid little emphasis on works, much less on a systematized and rationalized life of action. "Tears," he said, "precede works and suffering surpasses doing." His experience of forgiveness and of justification by faith led him to emphasize the inner life of the Christian rather than his outer life. Thus Lutheranism in its main tendency was never ascetic. The piety of the Lutheran was more like the casual piety of the Catholic layman. It was a piety dominated by emotion rather than by reason, and this characteristic was favored also by the considerable measure of sacramentarianism which Luther took over from Catholicism. But in Calvinism all this is reversed. By the ideal of man's chief end as the glorification of God, an ideal that is God-willed, and by the practical necessity of having some means of assurance, a necessity that springs from the doctrine of election when the sacramental approach to God is abandoned, the basis is furnished for a new conception of the secular life. The ideal of discipline, or 'asceticism,' proper to Catholic monasticism is now transferred to the secular life. Within the sphere of this life lies one's calling (so Luther), but calling now becomes the means of moral discipline (so Calvin). Just as the monk apart from the world must subject the whole of his life to the severest regulation, so now the Calvinist

within the world must rigorously discipline himself. His life is to be a rationalized life of systematic self-control. The monk did this to secure a reward. It was a work of supererogation. The Calvinist did it not for reward — that would be to deny the grace of God in election, but in order to secure the sense of assurance that he was elect. Yet this statement is not quite exact. The Calvinist practised self-discipline not even to secure assurance; he practised it for the glory of God, and in the practice of it assurance came. Assurance itself was not the aim but the consequence of this discipline, a kind of by-product, though a by-product of immense importance.<sup>9</sup>

(3) But further, as merit was not secured by the Catholic except through extraordinary effort, through works of supererogation, so *full* assurance did not come to the Calvinist except through perseverance. He must continue in good works if he is to continue in assurance. Thus the Calvinist, as contrasted with the Lutheran, was led again to transfer the Catholic monastic ideal of strict discipline to the secular life, the life of 'calling.' According to Sebastian Franck the significance of the Reformation is just this, that "every Christian must be a monk *his whole life long.*"<sup>10</sup> Instead of the spiritual aristocracy of the monks apart from the world, we now have, as Weber puts it, "a spiritual aristocracy of the elect within the world." We can now understand what the Calvinistic or, more generally,

<sup>9</sup> In this connection the statement of the Second Helvetic Confession on Good Works (section 16) is very characteristic: "These same works that are agreeable to God's will must be done, not to the end to merit eternal life by them . . . nor for ostentation's sake . . . nor for lucre . . . but to the glory of God, to command and set forth our calling and to yield Thankfulness unto God, and also for the profit of our neighbors [note how this last consideration comes in as a kind of afterthought]. . . . Yet we do not lightly esteem or condemn good works; because we know that a man is not created or regenerated through faith to be idle but rather that, without ceasing, he should do those things which are good and profitable." In this passage the performance of good works is chiefly in order to glorify God, and hence the emphasis upon ceaseless activity. The thought of assurance secured through good works is not expressed here, it is true, but it is only a step to this new thought, a step actually taken in the Westminster Confession.

<sup>10</sup> Similarly the Genoese ambassador Fieschi calls Cromwell's army a collection of monks.

the Puritan conception of 'calling' is, and in what respects it resembles or differs from Catholicism and Lutheranism. It is the life of strict discipline (an idea borrowed from Catholic monasticism) lived in the secular sphere (an idea borrowed from Luther) with the sole intent of glorifying God and with the blessed sense of assurance of election as its reward (the special contribution of Calvinism). We have thus finally arrived at the idea of the service of God through one's calling (*per vocationem*) as contrasted with Luther's idea of this service in one's calling (*in vocatione*). This life of calling must be quasi-ascetic, for the secular life tempts to the worship of the creature and so would detract from God's glory.<sup>11</sup> This 'asceticism' takes the form of the strictest regulation of the whole of life, as in monasticism. Assurance is attained only through perseverance. Life thus becomes thoroughly rationalized, Calvinistic piety at this point contrasting with Lutheran piety. It is rationalized by its aim, the glory of God, and by its method,<sup>12</sup> a life of ceaseless watchful<sup>13</sup> self-control. All this led practically to the development of an immensely intensified moral activity within the sphere of the secular life as the most noticeable characteristic of the Calvinistic churches and of similar Protestantism generally, a moral activity which has probably never been equalled before or since. It is (a) this rationalized theory of life, (b) this intensified mood for work, and (c) the quasi-ascetic discipline which accompanies both theory and mood that have immediate interest for Weber. Such an immense output of spiritual energy could not fail profoundly to influence subsequent generations. Can it be that these three factors, which grew directly out of the Calvinistic theology in its distinction from Rome on the one hand and from Lutheranism on the other, furnish the key to the development of the spirit of modern capitalism? Do these aspects of Calvinism furnish the middle

<sup>11</sup> For example, to allow our appetite to be the rule and measure of eating, is according to Baxter idolatry, and all sensuous pleasure is a worship of the creature.

<sup>12</sup> Compare the original meaning of Methodism.

<sup>13</sup> At this point introspection enters in, the anxious diagnosis of one's spiritual state. Weber calls it "spiritual bookkeeping."



term between Luther's conception of 'calling' performed in the secular life and that conception of money-making as in itself a 'calling' which in part constitutes the spirit of modern capitalism?<sup>14</sup>

#### IV

In the last main section of his essay Weber undertakes to show how this rationalized, strenuously active, methodically 'ascetic' mode of life, represented by the Puritan conception of 'calling,' furnishes the religious basis of capitalism, without which capitalism would never have attained the control which it now exercises over the minds of men. After all, however blind economists may be to the fact, metaphysical convictions are the only ones which have the power absolutely to dominate men's lives. Economic reasons alone cannot account for the extraordinary power in the western civilization of today which the money-making motive exerts. The whole point of Weber's essay is to show that something deeper, more transcendental, more idealistic, is at work here, and must be reckoned with if the psychology of capitalism, its spirit or temper, is to be adequately explained.

If one looks into Baxter's "The Saints' Everlasting Rest" or his "Christian Directory"<sup>15</sup> or similar pastoral works of the Puritan divines (and it is such practical works rather than the more theoretical dogmatic discussions which reflect the real moral interests of the masses), one is at first sight struck by the suspicious attitude toward riches expressed in all these writings,

<sup>14</sup> At this point Weber analyses the quasi-ascetic movements in non-calvinistic Protestantism, especially Pietism, Methodism, and some of the Baptist sects. In these movements the dogmatic support given by Calvinism to the methodically disciplined life within the world is more or less modified. Nevertheless the question of assurance in one form or another played an important part in all these movements. The 'state of grace' in the theory of all these manifestations of Reformed piety separates from the worldly life as a species of idolatry; and at the same time the guarantee of the preservation of this state of grace is not finally found in the sacraments, or confession, or in special incidental good acts, but only in the methodically good life distinguished from the worldly life though lived within it, in other words, in 'inner-worldly asceticism'. Thus Calvinism impressed its practical ideal of life upon all these movements, even when its dogmatic system had begun to disintegrate.

<sup>15</sup> Baxter is chosen as the best exponent of the Puritan conception of 'calling' in its more practical aspects.

in full harmony with the similar warnings of the mediaeval church. The possession of riches is regarded as dangerous, and equally so the pursuit of them. Riches tempt to confidence and contentment therein, to laziness and sensuality. The pursuit of them diverts from the main object of life, the glory of God. But in conjunction with all these warnings, and unconsciously confusing them, another note is sounded by these writers. They are constantly exhorting to industry. The saints' everlasting rest is a rest in the next life, not in this one. Here it behooves man to work, and ever more to work.

There are two chief motives given for work. Work is still, as it always has been in the western church, a means of discipline. It is the best prophylactic against what the Puritan called the "unclean life," against the sloth and sensuality which riches so often engender. Work in one's calling is Baxter's prescription against sexual temptation as well as against religious doubts. Again, work is to be done because God commanded it, in other words for his glory. This meant that utilitarian motives were disregarded or at least subordinated. So far as this life is concerned, work becomes an end in itself. It gains a meaning beyond itself only when looked at *sub specie aeternitatis*, from a religious and other-worldly point of view.

It is for action [says Baxter] that God maintaineth us and our activities. Work is the moral as well as the natural end of power. . . . It is action that God is most served and honored by. . . . The public welfare or the good of many is to be valued above our own.

This last sentence sounds like an expression of our own social-service ideal. It must be understood in the light of what has already been said as to the religious, depersonalized interest in public welfare, yet it does form, as Weber suggests, the point of transition from the motive of the glory of God to the utilitarianism of the later liberal theology. Again Baxter says:

Will not wealth excuse [from work]? Answer: It may excuse you from some sordid sort of work, by making you more serviceable to another, but you are no more excused from the service of work<sup>16</sup> . . . than the poorest man. . . . Though they [the rich] have no outward want to urge them, they have as great a necessity to obey God. . . . God has strictly commanded it [work] to all.

<sup>16</sup> Note the phrase "service of work"; work is really a service, a cult, one form of the service or worship of God.

Even Zinzendorf says: "One does not work simply to live, but one lives to work." The great scriptural warrant for the exhortation to work is 2 Thess. 3, 10, "that if any would not work, neither shall he eat." This passage emphasizes not the reward, but the duty, of work.<sup>17</sup> The Puritan will make the most of his calling. A bee-like industriousness is enjoined.

God hath commanded you [urges Baxter] some way or other to labor for your daily bread and not to live as drones of the sweat of others.

And again:

Be wholly taken up in diligent business of your lawful callings when you are not exercised in the more immediate service of God. . . . Labor hard in your calling. . . . See that you have a calling which will find you employment for all the time which God's immediate service spareth.<sup>18</sup>

The terrific Puritan drive toward intense activity is illustrated in various ways in Baxter's writings. For example, it leads him to elaborate the reasons for various callings. Specialization in callings educates and trains the skill of the laborer, and so enables him to increase his output quantitatively and to better it qualitatively. It thus makes for the common good, which is the good of the most people — ideas these which, as Weber reminds us, strikingly resemble the economic principles of Adam Smith. But it cannot be too often repeated that this apparent utilitarianism of Baxter is not in his case real utilitarianism. It springs out of religious interests, not out of humanitarian or economic interests. It is, so to speak, the 'ascetic' rather than the economic use of 'calling.' Industry in one's calling is the expression of the methodically disciplined life devoted to the glory of God. But, and this is to be remembered in view of what follows, the mood for work in such an 'ascetic'

<sup>17</sup> In the exposition of this text the Puritan point of view strikingly contrasts with the Roman Catholic. Thomas Aquinas interpreted the verse as applicable to the species man, rather than to the individual. The species must undoubtedly work, but how much the individual must labor will depend upon circumstances. If he is rich, he will not have to work. According to Baxter, rich and poor alike must work in order to obey and glorify God. This obligation to ceaseless activity also contrasts with the Lutheran type of piety, as we have already seen.

<sup>18</sup> At times Baxter seems to exalt the service of calling above worship itself. "To neglect this [work for the good of the church and the commonwealth] and to say, I will pray and meditate, is as if your servant should refuse your greatest work and tie himself to some lesser, easier part."



Protestantism, although engendered by religious considerations, may easily become diverted to a purely economic interest when once the other-worldly point of view is abandoned.

Again, the emphasis upon activity is indicated by what is said by Baxter and others on the use of time:

Keep up a high esteem of time and be every day more careful that you lose none of your time than you are that you lose none of your gold and silver. And if vain recreations, dressings, feasting, idle talk,<sup>19</sup> unprofitable company or sleep be any of them temptations to rob you of your time, accordingly heighten your watchfulness.

With these warnings of Baxter may be compared that of Matthew Henry: "Those who are prodigal of their time despise their own souls." Sloth becomes one of the deadly sins. It is, so to speak, a continuous sin, and thus interferes in the most dangerous way with the methodically disciplined life. To sleep more than six or at most eight hours is, according to Baxter, morally reprehensible. "Sloth," he says, "destroys the state of grace." We have not yet reached Franklin's "Time is money," but we have arrived at its religious counterpart. Time is infinitely valuable, for every lost hour detracts from the glory of God.<sup>20</sup>

Now all this emphasis upon industry and efficiency in a man's calling insensibly leads to a new attitude toward riches, in sharp contrast with the warnings against them already cited. As a matter of fact, the religious and disciplinary use of one's calling has much the same result as the directly economic exploitation of it. It inevitably leads to the accumulation of riches.

<sup>19</sup> "Every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give account thereof in the day of judgment" (Mt. 12, 36). This may account, according to Weber, in part at least, for the restraint and reticence of the Puritan in conversation.

<sup>20</sup> Weber calls attention to the fact that the first persons in the Middle Ages to regulate their time carefully were the monks, and the principal use of the church bells was to enable them to do this. He also refers to Sombart's observation that the development of the capitalistic spirit is indicated by the fact that on pocket watches the hours came to be divided into quarters. And how frequent is the exclamation of the modern business man, "I have no time for it!" Weber also notes the singular fact that in connection with the Puritan emphasis upon industry the towns, with their greater industry as compared with the rural districts, were looked upon as examples of the virtue of self-discipline! Baxter said of his laborers in Kidderminster: "Their constant converse and traffic with London doth much to promote civility and piety among tradesmen."

It is permissible to change one's calling if the glory of God can be better subserved. Practically this means, if the new calling is a more useful one; and the standards for judging its usefulness are first, its moral character, secondly, the importance of the goods to be produced, and thirdly, its profitableness, for if God who orders our lives provides a chance for profit, he has his own purposes in this, and therefore the chance of profit must be accepted. Thus Baxter says:

When God shows you a way in which you can lawfully make more without danger to your soul or to others<sup>21</sup> than you can in some other way, and when you reject this way and follow the way that brings in less, then you cross one of the purposes of your calling. You refuse to be God's steward and to accept his gifts in order to use them for others when he so demands. Of course [Baxter continues, as though aware of the danger of this advice] you are not to labor to be rich for the purposes of fleshy indulgence, but for God's sake.

To strive for riches as an exercise in one's calling is thus not only permissible, but commendable.

You may labor in that manner that tendeth most to success and lawful gain. You are bound to improve your talents.<sup>22</sup>

It was frequently argued that to wish to be poor was as absurd as to wish to be sick. As scriptural warrant for all this the parable of the talents did yeoman's service. Thus arises the strange anomaly that the pursuit of riches, which is such a danger to the soul, since it tends to divert it from doing all things to the glory of God, has become, from the standpoint of magnifying one's calling, not only permissible but a duty, and the possession of riches, which tempts to sensuality and sloth, has become a mark of faithfulness in the discharge of one's calling.<sup>23</sup> It is clear that in this whole development the decisive thing is the idea of 'calling,' that is, of the methodically dis-

<sup>21</sup> See below for Wesley's warning on this head.

<sup>22</sup> In these remarks Baxter unconsciously approaches dangerously near to the position of Mr. Money-love in the *Pilgrim's Progress*: "[A clergyman's] desire of a greater benefice is lawful (this cannot be contradicted), since 't is set before him by Providence. . . . I conclude, then, that a Minister that changes a Small for a Great should not, for so doing, be judged as covetous; but rather, since he is improved in his parts and industry thereby, be counted as one that pursues his call, and the opportunity put into his hand to do good."

<sup>23</sup> At this point the Old Testament theory of the close connection between goodness and prosperity is made much of. Weber points out how the self-made man now became

ciplined mode of life within the sphere of the secular.<sup>24</sup> The more intense the life of calling, the more God is honored; the more consistently such a life is lived, the more sure one can be of salvation. All this works out into an intensified industriousness, into the mood for work, and the natural economic result is riches. The most earnest adherents of the disciplinary ideal of Protestantism thus come to serve the interests of Capitalism. This result must now be studied more in detail.

The direct economic effects of the Puritan mode of life in calling are manifested in two ways. In the first place the 'ascetic' mode of life worked powerfully toward the limitation of consumption. The Puritan looked, for example, with suspicion upon fine clothes.<sup>25</sup> He looked with suspicion upon all the enjoyments of the senses as inclining to the worship of the creature. As a protest against the extravagant life of the feudal nobility the Puritan exalted the idea of stewardship. Enjoyment must not cost anything. To spend money upon one's self leads to unfaithfulness in stewardship. Frugality comes to be a cardinal virtue. Baxter says:

Every penny which is paid upon yourselves or your children or your friends must be done by God's own appointment, and to serve and please him [the glory of God motive]. Watch narrowly, or else that thievish, carnal self will leave God nothing.<sup>26</sup>

Accordingly, what is spent upon oneself must be strictly limited. It also follows that the more property one has, the greater the sense of stewardship. It must be kept unimpaired and even increased, as Jesus taught in the parable of the talents, for this redounds to the glory of God.

a morally transfigured man. To him, not to the feudal inheritor of wealth, comes the glory. He has obediently availed himself of the providentially offered chances of profit-making. "God blesseth his trade." It is also interesting to notice how in these Puritan writers thrifty Jacob is praised rather than his rival, the squanderer Esau.

<sup>24</sup> Tawney in his *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* freely acknowledges the great contribution which Weber has made at this point.

<sup>25</sup> He sought, in the interest of economy, uniformity in dressing and in the manner of life generally. The modern capitalistic counterpart of this, according to Weber, is standardization.

<sup>26</sup> Compare this with Franklin's advice as to saving. The motives differ, but the effect is the same.



In the second place, the intensified activity in one's calling which Puritanism encouraged led to a vastly increased production. Money-making was now freed from the traditional opprobrium which had attached to it. Profits had already been legalized. Calvin himself had seen to that, when, for the first time in history, he had advocated the permissibility of usury (interest). But now profits were looked upon as willed by God, as a mark of his favor and a proof of success in one's calling. The Puritans continued to wage war against the dangers of riches, yet this was not in opposition to rational business, but, as Weber puts it, to irrational consumption, to the extravagance and dissipation which wealth might encourage. Their attack was directed against indulgence in all the external forms of luxury which characterized the feudal aristocracy as a worship of the creature and as opposed to the rational, God-willed use of possessions for the good of the individual and the community. The limit of the permissible in consumption is defined by the word comfort. It was extravagance, display, that was sinful. The ideal of the home takes the place of the feudal ideal of the palace. So far as production was concerned, Puritanism fought against injustice in money-making, against hoarding, against mammonism, the love of riches for their own sake.

But at this point Puritanism found itself in a dilemma. On the one hand the pursuit of wealth for its own sake was sinful. On the other the religious value set upon constant, systematic, efficient work in one's calling as the readiest means of securing the certainty of salvation and of glorifying God became a most powerful agency in economic expansion. The rigid limitation of consumption on the one hand and the methodical intensification of production on the other could have but one result — the accumulation of capital.<sup>27</sup> But the Puritan attitude to calling, with its almost automatic result in accumulation of riches, was destined to become more influential than the Puritan fear of riches. To a very large extent the disciplinary rationalization of life as 'calling' accounts for the spirit of modern

<sup>27</sup> Mr. Money-love speaks of the tradesman who, by becoming religious, may mend his market.

capitalism. It is not the accumulation of capital in itself that is the decisive thing, but rather a methodical accumulation of it which is a chief characteristic of modern capitalism. And this methodical accumulation has at least one of its main motives in the Calvinistic conception of life as calling. Wherever the Puritan theory of life was held, it strengthened the tendency toward a rationalized, bourgeois, economic mode of life. The Puritan, as Weber expresses it, "stood at the cradle of the economic man."<sup>28</sup> Weber clinches his argument by the following remarkable paragraph from one of John Wesley's sermons:

I fear whenever riches have increased, the essence of religion has decreased in the same proportion. Therefore I do not see how it is possible in the nature of things for any revival of true religion to continue long. For religion must necessarily produce both industry and frugality, and these cannot but produce riches. But as riches increase, so will pride, anger, and love of the world in all its branches. How then is it possible that Methodism, that is, a religion of the heart, though it flourishes now like a green bay tree, should continue in this state? For the Methodists in every place grow diligent and frugal. Consequently they increase in goods. Hence they proportionately increase in pride, in anger, in the desire of the flesh, the desire of the eyes, and the pride of life. So, although the form of religion remains, the spirit is swiftly vanishing away. Is there no way to prevent this continued decay of pure religion? We ought not to prevent people from being diligent and frugal; we must exhort all Christians to gain all they can and to save all they can, that is, in effect, to grow rich. What way can we take that our money-making may not sink us to the nethermost hell? There is one way, and there is no other under heaven. If those who gain all they can and save all they can will also give all they can [the 'ascetic' motive], then, the more they gain the more they will grow in grace and the more treasure they will lay up in heaven.

To this passage I would add another taken from one of the last sermons preached by Wesley before his death:

After you have gained all you can and saved all you can, spend not one pound, one shilling, one penny, to gratify either the desire of the flesh, the desire of the eyes, or the pride of life, or for any other end than to please and glorify God [note the usual motive]. Having avoided this rock on the right hand, beware of that on the left. Hoard nothing. Lay up no treasure on earth; give all you can, that is, all you have. I defy all men upon earth, yea

<sup>28</sup> It was this self-disciplined, methodical manner of life which enabled the New England Puritan to outstrip so quickly the Southern Cavalier. By a restrained, methodical life investment-capital was accumulated in New England, whereas in the South it was spent. See above.

all angels in heaven, to find any other way to extract the poison from riches. . . . You who receive 500 pounds a year and spend only 200, do you give back 300 to God? If not, you certainly rob God of that 300. . . . Nay, may I not do what I will with my own? Here lies the ground of your mistake. It is not your own. It cannot be, unless you are lord of heaven and earth.

In these citations we have in a nutshell most of those fundamental ideas of Protestant 'asceticism' which Weber has been describing. Wesley correctly foresaw the dangers which would befall the church through the very virtues which Puritanism emphasized. What he did not foresee was the cosmic extent of these dangers. He did not foresee a world so dominated by money-making that its whole organization is determined by this one great aim. And now we are prepared to understand the way in which Protestant 'asceticism' became transformed into the spirit of modern capitalism.

As the great economic movements of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries developed through the increasing exploitation of the New World, Africa, and Asia, through the consequent growth of foreign trade, and through the rise of industrialism, the making of profits became an end in itself. *But before this was accomplished religion had consecrated money-making.* As Weber says, "What the great religious epoch of the seventeenth century bequeathed to its utilitarian heir was above all else a gloriously, one might even say a pharisaically, good conscience in money-making."

Is it merely a coincidence [asks the Quaker Rowntree] or is it a consequence that the lofty profession of spirituality made by the Friends has gone hand in hand with shrewdness and tact in the transaction of mundane affairs? Real piety favors the success of the trader by insuring his integrity [faithfulness in calling] and fostering habits of prudence and forethought, important items in obtaining that standing and credit in the commercial world which are requisite for the steady accumulation of wealth.

The relationship of the Puritan self-disciplined and methodical life, as seen in the words 'integrity,' 'prudence,' 'forethought,' to the methodical life of business, as seen in the phrase, 'the steady accumulation of wealth,' could not be more tellingly, because unconsciously, expressed. Every vestige of the old ecclesiastical theory that a tradesman could scarcely please God now disappeared, and the specifically bourgeois ethic repre-



sented in Franklin's maxims arose. No longer was money-making a means, by which the assurance of salvation could be secured or God be glorified. It had become an end in itself. The methodical 'asceticism' of the Puritan, his thrift and frugality, are now employed in a business interest. Baxter and Wesley exhorted their hearers to save in order not to rob God, and the habit of frugality was established; Franklin exhorts his young tradesman to save in order to accumulate capital. Puritanism had led to the rationalization of life as calling. Then a tragic thing happened. Capitalism saw the business significance of calling, removed the transcendental, other-worldly motive, and transformed 'calling' into a job.<sup>29</sup> In conclusion a few direct expressions of this singular development may be noted.

Poverty, to speak first of that, might be looked upon by the Puritan in either of two ways. When industry and frugality came to be emphasized as cardinal virtues, and success regarded as their natural reward, it was easy to argue, conversely, that failure meant the absence of these virtues. From this point of view poverty became associated with extravagance and sloth, and begging was regarded as an actual sin. The economic causes of poverty were overlooked. Begging, which was tolerated during the Middle Ages, and even regarded at times as a positive virtue (compare the Begging Orders), or at least as contributing an opportunity for the exercise of the Christian virtue of charity, was now regarded as a crime. When, on the

<sup>29</sup> It will be seen from the above, if I have correctly represented Weber's views, that it would be a gross misunderstanding of his essay if it were supposed to teach that modern capitalism is to be explained solely out of the Protestant 'ascetic' movement. Modern capitalism is an immensely complicated development. Reaching as it does into every nook and corner of our civilization, it would be idle to attempt to explain it out of any one cause. But what Weber does maintain is that one main reason why it has secured such a grip upon our civilization is to be found in the Protestant 'ascetic' movement which preceded it. This movement changed the attitude of the world toward money-making, and Weber shows how this was done through the conception of 'calling.' The spirit of capitalism, its peculiar system of motives, can only be adequately understood when its religious roots are taken into account. This fact economists and sociologists have largely ignored, but since the publication of Weber's essay they can no longer afford to neglect it.

other hand, the dangers of riches were emphasized, poverty might be looked upon as a discipline for godliness. Calvin had once expressed the unfortunate opinion that only when the masses of the people were kept poor would they remain obedient to God. In the Low Countries this view was secularized into the theory that men would work only when compelled to, and this, in turn, merged into the economic theory that increased productivity was proportioned to low wages. This was hard on the wage-earner. And it was not the only disadvantage that lay upon him, for, in the next place, Puritanism fostered the idea that faithfulness in one's calling was the duty of the workman in spite of low wages. He must work for conscience' sake. His rewards would be in the next life. Baxter encourages the employment of godly servants, for "a godly servant will do all your service in obedience to God as if God himself had bid him do it." At the same time Puritanism sanctified the exploitation of the willingness to work when it regarded profit-making by the employer as also a proper function of his calling. Weber grimly remarks: "One sees how the interest of God and the interest of the employer merge together at this point in a dangerous way." When the workman must work for conscience' sake and the employer must make profits for conscience' sake, the consequences for labor are obvious, and the terrible conditions in England in the earlier stages of the industrial revolution may be more easily understood. This conception of calling led, as we have seen, to intensified production and to an ever-increasing accumulation of capital. Capitalism at the time of its origin needed workmen who, for conscience' sake, would submit to economic exploitation in view of other-worldly rewards.<sup>30</sup> "Today," Weber points out, "capitalism sits in the saddle and is able to compel work without any promise of such rewards." It can do this because the workman has now become economically dependent upon his employer.

Again, incidentally, under the influence of the 'inner-worldly asceticism' of Protestantism, whatever there was of creative

<sup>30</sup> Sir William Petty attributed the great economic power of Holland in the seventeenth century to the fact that the dissenters (Calvinists and Baptists) looked upon industriousness as a duty toward God. Compare what was said above about the industriousness of German laborers in Pietistic circles.

pleasure in the craftsmanship of the Middle Ages was supplanted by the idea of duty and the promise of rewards hereafter. In the development of capitalism the other-worldly joys are lost sight of, and only joyless, depersonalized work remains. Incidentally, also, the inequalities between rich and poor which the economic development made ever more obvious were easily capable of being sanctified by the doctrine of election and God's providence.

In all these respects the gradual transformation of Puritan motives into capitalistic motives worked to the great disadvantage of labor, as was seen in the hideous conditions of labor at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries in England.

But it is not labor alone that has suffered in this transformation. The capitalist also, or rather capitalistic society as a whole, has to pay a terrific price. Weber calls attention again to the often observed 'ascetic' element in modern business which he himself traces back primarily to Puritanism. To be successful in business requires complete concentration upon it, the renunciation of other aims and other interests. This is only the secularized form of the Puritan absorption in 'calling.' Specialization, which always means renunciation, is required of the business man as well as of the Puritan. The latter had to be a specialist in his calling, if he were to secure assurance, the former must be a specialist (expert) in his business if he is to secure profits. But expertness can be secured only through self-denial and self-discipline,<sup>31</sup> and to be expert is essential to success in modern business life. This is what Weber means when he says: "The Puritan *desired* to be a man of calling; we *must* be this." Puritanism thus created the shell which capitalism has occupied now that the religious life has left it empty. Capitalism needs the transcendental motive less and less in order to move men to responsibility in calling, because it rests more and more on a machine basis. Weber is no doubt thinking of the way in which the precision and reliability of the machine are gradually taking the place of the efficiency and fidelity of the workman in his calling. Our mode of life has become ration-

<sup>31</sup> Compare what was said above, p. 167.



alized upon a mechanical basis instead of upon a religious one. And what is the final outcome? "When asceticism undertook to rebuild the world by expressing itself in the secular life, the external goods of the world secured an increasing and finally an inescapable power over men such as they have never had before in history." A vast civilization given over to the pursuit of wealth, whose entire economic structure is built up in the interest of profits and the profits reinvested for the sake of more profits — Mammon working blindly, almost automatically, yet with a kind of terrible demonic power, and Wall Street the final result of the doctrine of election! Has the whirligig of time ever cast up a stranger or more staggering paradox? What a tragic result of eliminating the other-worldly from our thoughts! A life rationalized on the basis of the glory of God and the assurance of salvation — that may be a dream, but it is certainly a finer and a more ennobling dream than a life rationalized on the basis of profits and ever more profits. The latter is a fundamentally irrational life, and when, with a secret suspicion of its futility, we turn profit-making into a game, we only still further betray our spiritual poverty and degradation.

And what chance, in view of Weber's analysis, it may finally be asked, has the Church in a world dominated by a huge and rapidly increasing population which needs subsistence, and by a profit-motive which seeks to make gain out of this need? These two economic factors in their interaction led to the imperialistic expansion which went on throughout the nineteenth century and resulted in the Great War of the twentieth century, but which has not yet run out its politically devastating course, for American imperialism has just begun its rake's progress. Do the churches realize the situation with which they are confronted? In proportion as they are educated, they have surrendered their dogmatic supports. In proportion as they represent the prosperous middle classes, they have more and more abandoned the heroism of the ethical and religious discipline which once gave them a real spiritual authority, and have adopted in its place a this-worldly orientation largely acquiescing in the domination of the present business formulation of life, consecrated as this is by its association with

religion, and they seek to salve their consciences by the adoption of a social-service ideal which too often means a further rationalization of religion in a new form and a dilettante dabbling in the economic and political problems of the times. The situation is probably the most serious the church has faced in its entire history. It is so serious because it is so hard to realize it, for the church no longer feels itself outside the world as it did in its struggle with the Roman Empire, but is itself an organic part of the vast complex which we call modern civilization. Being a part of this civilization, it seems to have lost the power objectively to analyse it. It does not realize that when, in a profoundly religious interest, it adopted the conception of 'calling' within the secular life, it helped, quite unconsciously, to pave the way for its own almost complete secularization.





## JOSIAH ROYCE — THEIST OR PANTHEIST?

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THE philosophy of Josiah Royce speaks often of the Absolute and of God, but has left his readers somewhat in doubt as to his exact theistic position. Those who have expressed their doubts attack the Roycean conception of the Absolute from two directions. Some find it not unified enough, others too unified, to be theistic. The former of these call attention to certain discussions in which Royce explains his world unity as a unity of meaning, or a mathematical infinite, or an all-inclusive concept, drawing therefrom the inference that the unity which he intended was only that of a logical possibility. Or, further, it is insisted that even if Royce may have intended real unity, there is serious question as to the success of his philosophic achievement. The Absolute is made to comprise such contradictory and discordant features that its harmony at least seems incongruous or forced. A unity composed of vigorously conflicting selves must be an aggregate rather than an organic whole.

If we take Royce at his word, he intends all reality to be unified. In concluding "The World and the Individual" he declares that "the one lesson of our entire course has thus been the unity of finite and of infinite."<sup>1</sup> He refers to "our theory of the unity of Being," and insists that for his theory the world "must be One."<sup>2</sup> The whole direction of Royce's thinking is toward unity. It is the measure of his progress, the condition of every value in his system. A unity of life on higher levels is the key to every solution for his problems, and if this unity is not real, then nothing is accomplished.

The question of Royce's success in reaching this intended unity of all reality is not so easily answered. Royce undertakes to establish this unity by investigating four possible concep-

<sup>1</sup> The World and the Individual, II, 1902, p. 417.

<sup>2</sup> The World and the Individual, I, 1900, pp. 401, 424.

tions of Being. He finds the realist's view of reality independent of any knowing subject to be logically self-destructive because his world falls apart into irreconcilable dualisms. The mystic's view is quite as abstract, for it holds the external inaccessible and surrenders all effort to escape subjectivity. Critical rationalism reduces Being to truth, but valid possibilities of experience are not yet real, for our ideas require an actual object other than themselves. To meet the demands arising from these three unsatisfactory views, Royce brings forward a fourth conception of Being, namely, a unity of external and internal in which the external reality fulfils the whole intent of the internal meaning. This view of reality he argues from the character of facts found always linked in orderly series to ideas which mean them, and the character of finite ideas and experiences which forever mean more than is clearly present. Because the object you mean cannot be independent of your meaning, and because its meaning cannot be wholly fulfilled in your present experience, the object must be present to an insight that includes your conscious intent and the larger meaning. "The One is in all and all are in One. All meanings, if completely developed, unite in one meaning, and this it is which the real world expresses."<sup>3</sup>

This larger insight is for Royce a conscious Self, inclusive of all reality. He employs it to solve the problems of finite limitation, ignorance and error, moral conflict, and the relation of the finite individual to the Whole. He invests everything in the unity of one Absolute Self. The unity of this one Self then demands that everything else be a state of that Mind. His unity is built first upon the assumption that material objects are not material at all but states of the divine Consciousness. It is built secondly upon the assumption that all finite beings are but fluent phases of this one Mind. "All varieties of individual expression are thus subordinate to the whole."<sup>4</sup> While this may not establish the success of his unity, it does suggest the extent to which Royce is willing to go to make that unity effective. One may doubt on empirical or logical grounds whether material things and finite selves can be thus reduced to states of an Ab-

<sup>3</sup> *The World and the Individual*, I, p. 394.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

solute Mind, but grant his premise and there is no denying him his unity. If Royce is willing to sacrifice the finite, he thereby renounces the charge that the Absolute in his philosophy is not unified enough to be theistic.

There remains for consideration the other difficulty, that the Roycean Absolute is too unified to be theistic. The former criticism was that the Absolute falls short of theism, while this view would urge that it goes beyond theism, that it is pantheistic. A philosophy of religion built upon monistic lines is at once open to the suspicion of pantheism. With Royce's persistent emphasis on the unity of all reality and his just as persistent determination to call that unity God, the suspicion is not easily allayed. God is identified not only with the Absolute, but with all life, including man and his world. The following statements coming from different periods represent fairly well this pantheistic tendency:

1. "God's life includes in the organic total of one conscious eternal instant all life, and so all goodness and evil" (*The Religious Aspects of Philosophy*, 1885, p. 457).
2. "For the Self is all that is, and his world is the chosen outcome of his eternal reality" (*The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, 1892, p. 307).
3. "God . . . is the very life of the world taken in its wholeness." "The One is all, and all are in the One" (*The World and the Individual*, I, 1900, pp. 395, 394).
4. "Man the community may prove to be God" . . . or "the whole universe . . . both a community, and a divine being" (*The Problem of Christianity*, I, 1913, p. 409; preface, p. xxxvi).

In his first book Royce freely confesses that he is "quite indifferent whether anybody calls all this Theism or Pantheism."<sup>5</sup> He holds that it differs from the common form of either position, which traditionally has conceived God in terms of power, either external or internal to the world of things. Royce finds the power conception of God (including the problems of causation and creation) contradictory and fruitless. "God as Power would be nothing, or finite. God as Thought can be and is all in all."<sup>6</sup> It is only for convenience that he ventures to call this Universal Thought God, and the conception is not to be con-

<sup>5</sup> *The Religious Aspects of Philosophy*, 1885, p. 477.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*



fused with the God of traditional theology. It is rather the God of the idealistic tradition from Plato downwards. This suggests a leaning toward pantheism, though he is consciously standing on neutral ground. An earlier phrase, "Our hypothesis is not yet pantheistic, nor theistic," seems to characterize his condition at that time as one of uncertainty.

His next publication, seven years later, represents "a considerable advance in the organization of the philosophical doctrine which was set forth in the former book."<sup>7</sup> In this work he seems to imply that he is a theist,<sup>8</sup> though the reference is not entirely clear. The clearest advance toward theism is the attribution of fuller personality to the Absolute. The former characterization, 'Infinite Thought,' now becomes 'Self' or 'World-Self.' In the same year (1892) Royce published an article on 'The Implications of Self-Consciousness,' in which he declared: "The Infinite is unquestionably a Person, and this Person is as unquestionably the world-possessor."<sup>9</sup> During these years he seems to have been consciously moving toward theism, so that in 1895, when he delivered his lecture on 'The Conception of God' at the University of California, he declares that his "conception of God undertakes to be distinctly theistic, and not pantheistic."<sup>10</sup> To substantiate this, he points out that his view is not of any Unconscious Reality into which finite individuals are absorbed, nor of any Universal Substance before whose law our ethical independence crumbles, nor of any Ineffable Mystery that we can only silently adore. In distinction from these, his conception of God, he believes, preserves every ethical predicate that religious

<sup>7</sup> *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, 1892, preface, p. vii.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 347. Mary W. Calkins quotes this as ground for the statement that "Dr. Royce explicitly labels himself 'a theist.'" But the reference reads, "In what sense, above all, can I pretend to be a theist, and to speak of the Absolute Self as the very essence and life of the whole world?" which hardly seems an explicit confession. Even if Royce is here admitting his own position, it is not contrasted with pantheism but with atheism. The uncertainty at issue with us here, and presumably with Miss Calkins, is thus not materially relieved by this reference. See Mary W. Calkins, 'The Foundation in Royce's Philosophy for Christian Theism,' in *Papers in Honor of Josiah Royce*, edited by J. E. Creighton, 1916, p. 55.

<sup>9</sup> *The New World*, vol. I, pp. 289-310; reprinted in *Studies of Good and Evil*, 1898, p. 141.

<sup>10</sup> *The Conception of God*, p. 49.

faith in its highest form has ever ascribed to God. Without wishing to be a slave to tradition he feels "disposed to insist that what the faith of our fathers genuinely meant by God" is essentially identical with the outcome of his philosophy.

From these statements it should be evident that the direction of Royce's growth was toward theism. At the time of publishing his first work he was neutral and undecided with reference to this problem. He confesses <sup>11</sup> lack of clearness during the years that followed this publication as to how his doctrine ought to apply to the problem of Individuality. By 1892 he is giving a more personal note to his Absolute, and by 1895 he accepts Individuality as the central problem confronting his idealistic view, and develops the Will of the Absolute in order to give it proper place. By 1899 he devotes the Gifford Lectures to "a deliberate effort to bring into synthesis . . . the relations of Knowledge and Will in our conception of God." <sup>12</sup> He recognizes that his earlier concept, 'Thought,' was inadequate to express the meaning of Individuality, and therefore undertakes to reorganize his conception of God around Personality in its fuller content. From the time that he reached a view giving central place to the individuality of God and man, he considered his philosophy distinctly theistic.

The question of regarding Royce as a theist, however, will have to be settled on other grounds than his desire or intention. It will first be necessary to distinguish the essential meaning of theism, and then in this light to study the logical implications of the Roycean position. Theism, etymologically, means belief in God. Common usage has confined its application to belief in one God, and collaboration with correlative terms has placed its meaning midway between deism and pantheism. Deism means belief in a God wholly transcendent, pantheism belief in a God wholly immanent, while theism means belief in a God at once transcendent and immanent.

Royce everywhere repudiates an external God, and it is probably in reaction from deism that he will have nothing to do with creation and causation. His interest and argument seek ever

<sup>11</sup> *The World and the Individual*, I, preface, p. xiii.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, I, preface, p. ix.

for an immanent God. This emphasis on immanence has led the majority of his critics to pronounce him a pantheist. William James declared of the Roycean philosophy, "It is pantheistic, and undoubtedly has already blunted the edge of the traditional theism in protestantism at large."<sup>13</sup> That there is no little evidence in support of such a view, was suggested at the opening of this study. The emphasis upon God's oneness with the unity of all reality has settled the question for many. Theism, of course, includes immanence, but it is distinguished from pantheism by its insistence that there shall also be transcendence.

J. W. Buckham holds that Royce's philosophy "only lacks the supplementary truth of transcendence to become a fresh and illuminating expression of Christian Theism."<sup>14</sup> Miss Calkins, on the other hand, maintains that Royce's God is transcendent and theistically Christian.<sup>15</sup> When we turn to Royce himself, we find him maintaining a certain kind of transcendence. In order to make clear what Royce's position is, it will be necessary to distinguish two kinds of transcendence, external and internal. External transcendence would insist that God be outside of and other than his created system. This kind of transcendence Royce will not have. Internal transcendence, on the other hand, provides for differentiation within the system, in which God rises above finite details to hold them in perspective. This kind of internal transcendence Royce maintains. He describes God as "One Absolute World-Self, who embraces and is all reality; whose consciousness includes and infinitely transcends our own."<sup>16</sup> The Self that holds time and all other successive finite details in perspective, "viewed, so to speak, from above and in its wholeness,"<sup>17</sup> Royce calls transcendent. On these grounds he meets in his way the immanence-transcendence test of theism. "God is immanent in the finite, because nothing is which is not a part of his total self-expression. He is tran-

<sup>13</sup> W. James, *Pragmatism*, 1907, p. 17.

<sup>14</sup> John W. Buckham, 'The Contributions of Professor Royce to Christian Thought,' *Harvard Theological Review*, vol. VIII, 1915, p. 231.

<sup>15</sup> *Papers in Honor of Josiah Royce*, p. 55.

<sup>16</sup> *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 349; see also pp. 380 and 425.

<sup>17</sup> William James, and *Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life*, 1911, p. 168.



scendent of all finitude, because the totality of finite processes is before him at once, while nothing finite possesses true totality." <sup>18</sup>

This locates the issue in the question of which kind of transcendence is the test of theism. If internal transcendence is sufficient, then Royce may be a theist. But if external transcendence is essential to theism, Royce would be a pantheist. External transcendence, if complete, would be deism and to that extent a denial of theism. If transcendence is partial (which is equivalent to saying partially immanent), it would seem to become involved in a system that unless arbitrarily truncated would include both God and man. If God and man be included in one system his transcendence will of course be internal within that system.

This leaves us with two forms of theism: dualistic and monistic. The theist who insists upon external transcendence will be confronted by the dualistic dilemma with no apparent basis for uniting the two worlds. It is difficult to see how this dualism can escape deism. For if the divine and human systems should meet, it would merely be accidental coincidence unless there is some inclusive or unifying system. But if there is a unifying system it returns again to monism. It will then be objected that the monistic theist has as much difficulty in avoiding pantheism as the dualistic theist has in escaping deism. If God is the Whole, how can he effect transcendence? Royce would reply: Because he is Personality and by personal experience we know how the whole mind transcends its parts.

By viewing reality as Personality, therefore, Royce validates his claim to theism. It may be contested that the difference between his monistic theism and personalistic pantheism is not wide. But after all what does the label matter? Royce stands on theistic ground in his reaction against deism on the one hand and impersonal pantheism on the other. Whether his position is theistically satisfactory will have to be decided on the merits of the case rather than on the terminology. Is Royce's monistic position sufficient to escape the difficulties of crude pantheism and preserve the values demanded by theism? Is his internal

<sup>18</sup> William James, and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life, p. 286.

transcendence effective or does it slip back into the engulfing immanence?

Absolute theism cannot overlook the following difficulties. All reality may be personal, but, if constituted of discordant elements, then endangers the unity of God. The evil, error, and ignorance of the finite is carried up into the Infinite, thus impugning the goodness, truth, and knowledge of God. The parts are equivalent to the Whole, thus leaving uncertainty as to what after all is God. The Whole is identical with the part; if so, why not call the part the whole and avoid the unnecessary and gratuitous assumption of an Absolute beyond empirical demonstration?

For each of these difficulties Royce has his answer. All concrete, active, living unity is a unity of contrast, so that the contradictory elements in God contribute to the rich variety and wealth of meaning in his life. The evil and error which enter God's experience are necessary to his complete knowledge of all facts, but do not impugn his goodness and truth, for he overcomes ignorance and error with his larger insight, and renounces evil by triumphing over it in his victorious goodness. The parts are futile and defeated in and of themselves; it is only by union with the Whole that they find meaning. God is the Whole that saves the parts by organizing them into perfect life. The Whole may be identical with the part only in a self-representative system, which is to say that the Whole of God is present in every meaning or expression which he manifests in the part. The Absolute is no gratuitous assumption, for every partial view of reality falls into contradiction and only the Absolute explains.

From this it is evident that Royce can neither be waved aside at the first cry of pantheist, nor readily disposed of by the traditional arguments brought against monism. For the monism of Royce is laid out upon personalistic lines, and while the absolute nature of it may lead us to suspect an eventual falling into pantheistic difficulties, the way to such difficulties must be demonstrated, not taken for granted. Distinctions of value are the property of Personality, and to that extent his internal transcendence may be effective. What becomes of material things and finite beings is another question beyond the limits

of this inquiry. It may appear that the finite difficulty is the vulnerable point in Royce's philosophy. But as for the Infinite, we are led by this investigation to conclude that the God of Royce may justly be called theistic.



